Due to the rapid evolution and usage of IoT devices in the world, the need for lightweight cryptography for resource-constrained devices gained a great importance. Although it has been common in the cryptology community that stream ciphers are supposed to be more efficient in speed and area than block ciphers, it has been seen in the last 10-15 years that most of ciphers designed for resource-constrained devices to take up less area and less energy on hardware-based platforms, such as ASIC or FPGA, are lightweight block ciphers. On the other hand, the design and analysis of stream ciphers using keyed internal update function is put forward against this belief and it has become one of the popular study subjects in the literature in the last few years. Plantlet, proposed in 2017, and its predecessor Sprout, proposed in 2015, are famous algorithms as examples of stream ciphers using keyed internal update function. Sprout was broken after a short time by many researchers but Plantlet hasn't been succesfully broken yet.
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Traditionally, key stream generators of stream ciphers update their internal states only by using their current internal state. Since the use of the key in the internal update is a new approach, the security analysis of this approach is not fully understood. In this study, the security analysis of the key stream generators with keyed update function has been studied. A new attack algorithm for internal state recovery and key recovery has been developed and mounted on Plantlet algorithm as an instance of stream ciphers with keyed update function.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the use of the IoT devices like RFID tags, wireless sensors increases, the exchange of confidential data over the Internet by IoTs increases and the IoTs become susceptible to various attacks. One of the countermeasures of providing the security of IoTs is the cryptographic algorithms which should be implemented on them. Since these devices are resource-constrained, conventional cryptographic algorithms are not preferred. Lightweight cryptography aims to provide solutions for resource-constrained devices having restricted hardware environments where the gate count, the power consumption or the memory is limited.
Many ultra lightweight block ciphers such as PRESENT [1] , KTANTAN [2] , LED [3] , Piccolo [4] , Midori [5] , SIMON/SPECK [6] and Simeck [7] have been developed but ultra lightweight stream ciphers are not so easily designed because of the design principle that internal state size must be must be at least 2K bits to provide a K-bit security level.
A new stream cipher, Sprout [12] , was proposed by Armknecht and Mikhalev at FSE 2015 with a novel idea for keystream generators having shorter internal state size by using a fixed key in the internal state update function. Sprout was broken after a short time by many researchers [13] , [14] , [16] , [17] , [18] so the designers of Sprout developed another algorithm, Plantlet by fixing the bugs and the weaknesses of Sprout [15] . Plantlet has been in the literature for about 2 years and there has been no successful attack proposed for Plantlet.
One of the attacks mounted on Sprout was Kara and Esgin generic internal state recovery attack [14] . The main weakness of Sprout is its round key function.
The key bits are not always involved in the internal state update function where feedback values can be determined or guessed without knowing the key. They defined guess capacity as guessing a feedback value from a given internal state alone without knowing the key. The guess capacity of Sprout is not one-half because of the round key function and the attack was successful for stream ciphers with keyed update functions having guess capacity higher than one-half like in Sprout.
In this study, we proposed a new generic internal state and key recovery attack for stream ciphers with keyed update function having guess capacity one-half and applied it on Plantlet. We used the attack developed by Kara and Esgin [14] as the starting point. Their attack was mounted on Sprout but could not be mounted on Plantlet because the guess capacity of Plantlet is onehalf because of the round key function of Plantlet. We developed a new attack using the weakness of involving key directly in the internal state update function and at the end of the attack, we recovered internal state bits and key bits at the same time. Since the internal state size of Plantlet is greater than key size, to decrease the complexity of the attack, we modified the new attack by using variables for some taps of the LFSR and also added another phase by solving nonlinear equations during key recovery. As a proof of concept, we tested this novel idea with six variables and successfully implemented the attack. For Plantlet, 22 variables must be used for the attack to be faster than exhaustive key search. Using 22 variables would need precomputation and memory for the multiplication of the NFSR bits and solving the nonlinear equations.
II. STREAM CIPHERS AND KEYSTREAM GENERATORS
Cryptography is the science of using mathematics for securing data. Cryptography enables you to store or transmit data across insecure networks so that it cannot be read by anyone except the receiver. While cryptography is the science of securing data, cryptanalysis is the science of analyzing and breaking secure communication which is a combination of analytical reasoning, application of mathematical tools, pattern finding, patience, determination. Cryptology comprises both cryptography and cryptanalysis.
The most common service of cryptology is confidentiality (by encryption) but it is also used for authentication, integrity, non-repudiation, anonimity, availability, privacy, etc.. Confidentiality is provided by encryption algorithms; ciphers. Ciphers are classified into two groups, as symmetric and asymmetric ciphers. In symmetric ciphers, same key is used in encryption and decryption. Symmetric key ciphers are also classifed into two groups as block ciphers and stream ciphers.
Stream cipher is a symmetric key cipher where plaintext digits are combined with a pseudorandom cipher digit stream, called keystream. A secret key and a public initialization vector (IV) is shared between two parties. After an initialization stage, keystream is generated by a keystream generator and plaintext digits are XOR'ed with generated keystream forming ciphertext digits. At the receiver side same scenario is applied.The keystream bits generated by the same key stream generator are XOR'ed with the ciphertext digits to form the plaintext digits. Use of IV is necessary, otherwise the same stream will be produced each time unless the key is not changed.
Keystream generation is the focus of the stream ciphers. Designing a stream cipher consists of designing the keystream generator mainly. The formal definition of a keystream generator is given below:
A keystream generator(KSG) is executed on three sets
and consists of three functions
• an initialization function Init : IV × K → S • an update function Upd : S → S • an output function Out : S → GF (2) A KSG operates in two phases:
• In the initialization phase, the KSG takes as input a secret key k and an IV iv and sets the internal state to an initial state st 0 := Init(iv, k) • Afterwards, the keystream generation phase executes the following operations repeatedly (for t > 0): -Output the next keystream bit z t = Out(st t ) -Update the internal state st t to st t+1 := Upd(st t ) Keystream generation does not directly involve key anymore in the conventional scenario. In stream ciphers, since encryption or decryption is just an XOR operation, an adversary can easily recover the keystream for the known plaintext scenario. For a stream cipher to be secure:
• An adversary can not generate the keystream in forward or backward direction or can not recover the key, if she knows some part of the keystream. • It could not be possible to recover any state of the cipher at time t where t > 0. If an adversary recovers the state, he can generate the keystream in forward or backward direction.
III. GRAIN FAMILY
For a stream cipher to be used for lightweight cryptography, it must either be very fast in software or very small in hardware. Otherwise, AES in OFB or CFB mode would be a more preferrable option for a user. This opinion has been reflected by the eSTREAM Project [8] , which was launched in 2004 as part of ECRYPT, the European Network of Excellence in Cryptology. The goal of eSTREAM was to promote the design of new stream ciphers with a particular emphasis on algorithms that would be either very fast in software or very resource-efficient in hardware. A new stream cipher Grain was developed by Martin Hell, Thomas Johansson and Willi Meier for eSTREAM Project [9] and Grain v1 was one of the seven final ciphers of the eSTREAM portfolio for the hardware-oriented part in 2008 [9] . Since Grain v1 has 80 bit key length, the designers developed Grain128 [10] and Grain128a [11] for the 128 bit key security. The Grain family algorithm structure is shown in Figure 1 . The Grain family algorithm is a bit oriented synchronous stream cipher. The design is based on two shift registers, one with linear feedback (LFSR) and one with nonlinear feedback (NFSR) and an output function. Both shift registers are 80/128 bits in size. The key size is 80/128 bits and the IV size is specified to be 64/96 bits.
The 256 memory elements in two shift registers represent the state of the cipher. The output function is the combination of inputs from both the NFSR and the LFSR. Before the keystream is generated, the cipher is initialized with the key and the IV by filling the NFSR and the LFSR with them and clocking the cipher.
IV. SPROUT
The internal state sizes of Grain family algorithms' are double of the key sizes. This design principle is a limitation emerging from the TMDTO attacks. A new algorithm, Sprout, using basic design of Grain family was developed at 2015 by Armknecht and Mikhalev [12] . Grain128a [11] is the starting point of Sprout and the aim was to make stream ciphers more resistant to TMDTO attacks even when shorter internal states are used.
TMDTO attacks against keystream generators can be done in two ways: The internal state (ST) is composed of a variable st and a fixed part k. The state update also depends on the fixed secret key. The advantage of using a fixed key is that the cipher would have at least 2 k different key-stream equivalence since ST = (st,k) and ST' = (st',k') with k = k' will never produce the same keystream. A security level of 2 k , independent of the length of the variable state, is achieved so it is possible to use a shorter internal state and save area size. Using a fixed value is preferred because it is possible to implement a lightweight version of such a generator in terms of area by fixing key since a fixed key does not have area cost.
Sprout uses an LFSR, an NFSR and an output function and these components are connected in a similar way like in Grain family.
A. Guess-and-Determine Attack Against Sprout
Cryptanalysis of Sprout was done by many researchers and many attacks were proposed [13] , [16] , [17] , [18] in a very short time. One of them was Guess-and-Determine attack developed by Kara and Esgin [13] . It is an internal state recovery attack. Later they generalize their attack in [14] .
It is a generic attack not only for Sprout. They make a new definition as keystream generators with Boolean Keyed Feedback Function (KSGs with Boolean KFF) where the key-dependent part of the Keyed Update Function (KUF) is a Boolean function where only one bit of the output of KUF depends on the key. They don't focus on internal structures of output and feedback functions, their input sizes or tap points of Sprout. Their attack can be applied to any KSGs with Boolean KFF with a limitation that the cipher should have the average guess capacity higher than one-half. They applied the generic attack on Sprout as a KSG with Boolean KFF.
They defined guess capacity as guessing a feedback value from a given internal state alone without knowing the key. Informally guess capacity is the average probability of guessing a feedback value correctly for a known internal state and an unknown key. If this guess capacity is higher than one-half, it means that it would be possible to suggest a feedback value and check whether this guess is correct or not using the output stream.
The main weakness in Sprout round key function was that key bits are not directly involved in the NFSR update function which determines the feedback value of NFSR. Guess capacity is not one-half for Sprout which makes Sprout as an instantination of KSGs with Boolean KFF having guess capacity greater than one-half and the attack can be applied to Sprout.
After Sprout is broken, the designers of Sprout propose a new algorithm Plantlet [15] having guess capacity equal to one-half where this attack can not be applied. This new algorithm type having guess capacity equal to one-half is the subject of our study.
V. PLANTLET
Planlet is a lightweight 80 bit stream cipher designed for low area requirements. It inherits the overall structure of Sprout but implements fixes for discovered vulnerabilities of Sprout. The fixes done in the Planlet design are:
• LFSR size is enlarged from 40 bits to 61 bits, IV size is enlarged from 70 to 90 bits. • Key selection round key function is updated. At each update a key bit is involved. • Double-layer LFSR is introduced for high period and prevents LFSR being initialized with the allzero case. Since Plantlet is an upgrade version of Sprout and discovered vulnerabilities are fixed for Plantlet, there has been no successful attack on Plantlet since it was introduced in 2017.
The Planlet structure is shown in Figure 2 . The following notation is given below which will be used to understand Plantlet specification and the generic attack we applied on it. Notation • t -the clock-cycle number • L t = (l t 0 , l t 1 , l t 2 , ..., l t 60 ) -state of the LFSR during the clock-cycle t • N t = (n t 0 , n t 1 , n t 2 , ..., n t 39 ) -state of the NFSR during the clock-cycle t • C t = (c t 0 , c t 1 , c t 2 , ..., c t 8 ) -state of the counter during the clock-cycle t • k = (k 0 , k 1 , k 2 , ..., k 79 ) -key • k t -the round key bit generated during the clockcycle t • z t -the keystream bit generated during the clockcycle t 1) Double-Layer LFSR: 2 different phase dependent LFSRs are used. They both use the same hardware and almost same primitive polynomials.
l t+1 59 = l t 54 +l t 43 +l t 34 +l t 20 +l t 14 +l t 0 for 0 =< t =< 319 l t+1 60 = l t 54 + l t 43 + l t 34 + l t 20 + l t 14 + l t 0 for t >= 320 2) NFSR and Counter: The 40 bit NFSR and 9 bit counter are adopted from Sprout.The NFSR update function is XOR of non-linear combination of several NFSR bits, current key bit, output of the LFSR l t 0 and a counter bit.
n t+1 39 = k t + l t 0 + c t 4 + n t 0 + n t 13 + n t 19 + n t 35 + n t 39 + n t 2 .n t 25 + n t 3 · n t 5 + n t 7 · n t 8 + n t 14 · n t 21 + n t 16 · n t 18 + n t 22 · n t 24 + n t 26 · n t 32 + n t 14 · n t 21 + n t 33 · n t 36 · n t 37 · n t 38 + n t 10 · n t 11 · n t 12 + n t 27 · n t 30 · n t
31
The counter is a 9 bit register. The first seven bits of the counter are used to count cyclically from 0 to 79. The two most significant bits are used as a 2-bit counter to determine the number of elapsed clock cycles in the initialization phase, it is triggered by the resets of the lower 7 bits. It is reset to 0 after 4 × 80 = 320 clock cycles and indicates the end of the initialization phase.
3) Round Key Function: 80 bit key is used. Round key function cyclically selects the next key bit for the NFSR update function. k t = k tmod80 , t ≥ 0 4) Output Function: Original output function of Sprout is used. It has nonlinear parts from both LFSR and NFSR and linear XOR of bits from both the LFSR and the NFSR. z t = n t 4 · l t 6 + l t 8 · l t 10 + l t 32 · l t 17 + l t 19 · l t 23 + l t 30 + n t 4 · l t 32 · n t 38 + n t 1 + n t 6 + n t 15 + n t 17 + n t 23 + n t 28 + n t 34 VI. NEW GUESS AND DETERMINE ATTACK The Planlet round key function is an improved version of Sprout. It cyclically selects the next key bit for the NFSR update function. Since k 0 is XOR'ed in the function, guess capacity is one-half and it is impossible to use guess capacity as a distinguisher for Kara and Esgin attack [14] but this design, involving key bit cyclically in the NFSR update function created a new weakness. The same key bit is used at clocks t and t + keysize for an internal state and this is used for both internal state recovery and key bit recovery at the same time.
We changed Kara and Esgin algorithm [13] for our attack. The states are not eliminated for their mismatch counts. Since all of them would have approximately same mismatch counts because of having the same guess capacity, one-half. The number of the iterations is a little above key size, 90 for Plantlet. The feedback value is either determined from the output stream or guessed. Since the key bit is directly XOR'ed in the NFSR update funtion, we calculated the key value at each clock from feedback value and internal state values and saved the key value at each clock. After 80 clocks, we begin also comparing key value of the internal state candidate at clock t and the key value we saved at (t − 80). For correct state, they would be same at the corresponding clocks but for an incorrect internal state candidate, they would be randomly equal and after a few clocks, the state will be eliminated since key values will not match. Correct state will exist until the end of clocks (iteration) and at the same time key bits are also determined.
Determination of feedback value from output stream is given below:
This implies for a internal state candidate at clock t when n t 6 and l t 34 are equal to 1, feedback value of NFSR can be calculated from z t+2 , LFSR and NFSR tap values.
This algorithm can be used for KSGs with Boolean KFF where key size and internal state size are equal but it is not effective for Plantlet since Plantlet internal state size is 101 bits. For this attack, the attacker should use 2 101 internal state candidate to determine the correct internal state which is much higher than 2 80 .
VII. PARAMETRIC GUESS AND DETERMINE ATTACK
Before implementing the new idea on the attack, two improvements are done to simplify the attack for Plantlet. In the first step, cipher was run in backward direction and the keystream generation and feedback functions are formulated in backward direction as in [13] done for Sprout. This improvement is done since in the output function of the cipher n t 1 alone is XORed with other taps. In backward direction, n t+1 0 will be the feedback value and n t 1 will be the feedback value after two clocks which can be determined from output stream value z t+2 and the output function. In the previous attack, the feedback values were either determined or guessed, but in this attack the feedback values can be always determined from the output stream. In the second step, we simulated Plantlet running in backward direction as if it runs in forward direction.
The new idea in order to decrease the complexity of the attack was replacing some elements of LFSR with variables during the attack. We randomly defined some elements of LFSR as the new variables and implemented the attack algorithm using the internal state candidates with LFSR of this type.
As a proof of concept, we implemented algorithm with six variables and recovered the correct internal state bits and key bits successfully. Six random elements of LFSR are chosen as variables x,y,z,w,k,u. The feedback values and key values are calculated as nonlinear equations of x,y,z,w,u,k. Since there are six variables, nonlinear equations have 2 6 = 64 combination of x,y,z,w,k,u. At the end of the attack, we have nonlinear equations representing key values k t for t = 0, 1, 2, ...90 where k t = k t+80 which should be equal to each other for the correct internal state candidate.
At this stage, an exhaustive search is done for x,y,z,w,k,u values. There are 2 6 = 64 different candidates for them. The system is solved for a unique solution if the system contains 6.2 equations on average. A candidate is either eliminated or one solution is left. For the correct internal state candidate one left x,y,z,w,k,u solution satisfies all the equations and key is also recovered by solving the equations for k 0 to k 80 .
In the previous attack, the attacker should use 2 101 internal state candidates for Plantlet but this improvement decreases the internal state candidate number to 2 95 . Same attack algorithm is used but comparison of the key values differed. Key values are nonlinear equations of variables where k t should be equal to k t−80 . At the end of the iterations, the correct internal state and the key values are recovered since wrong internal candidates are eliminated during solving equations for variables or checking whether the next equation is satisfied for the left unique solution of variables. The time for multiplying the NFSR bits as nonlinear equations and solving the nonlinear equations should be added to attack complexity.
The elapsed times for both attacks are compared for 1000 internal state candidates. Both new guess and determine attack and parametric guess and determine attack with 6 variables are executed on a standard PC. The time elapsed during new guess and determine attack is 0.12 seconds and the time elapsed during parametric guess and determine attack is 6.6 seconds. The new guess and determine attack is about 55 times faster than the parametric guess and determine attack, but this is as expected since each bit is represented by 64 bits and multiplication of two bits transformed into the multiplication of two 64 bits. This test coding is done as a proof of concept, not for performance but it is still faster than new guess and determine attack using 2 101 candidates.
For Plantlet, the attacker should use the attack algorithm with 22 variables to be faster than exhaustive key search but implementation of using 22 variables would not be similar to using 6 variables. We have two problems to solve: 1) Generating the nonlinear equations for 2 22 combinations of variables and the multiplication of two nonlinear equations having 2 22 combinations of variables. 2) Solving nonlinear equations having 2 22 combinations of 22 variables. These two items can not be done online during attack since it would decrease the attack speed exponentially. For the first item, the multiplication of two nonlinear equations having 2 22 combinations of variables can be implemented as multiplication of two polynomials and can be precomputed offline and saved in a table. During the attack, when two NFSR bits are multiplied, the result will be read directly from this table. The memory access should be done for each multiplication of NFSR bits. For the second item, solving nonlinear equations having 2 22 combinations of 22 variables can also be precomputed offline and saved in group of tables as 2 22 23 solutions. Since the nonlinear equations will be solved on average 23 equations but this will need a huge memory. When the nonlinear equations for key equalities are created at the end of the attack algorithm, the solutions should be searched from these tables.
The memory needed for the attack for p variables can be formulated as 2 2p for the multiplication table and 2 p p+1 for solving the nonlinear equations. The attack complexity would be 2 n−p if the generation and solving the nonlinear equations would be done by table lookups and the memory needed for the attack would be 2 2p + 2 p p+1 . Multiplication table would be accesed for each and gate of the feedback and the output function.
VIII. CONCLUSION
One of the countermeasures of providing the security of IoTs is the cryptographic algorithms which should be implemented on them. In this study, the security analysis of stream ciphers having keystream generator with keyed update function is done and a generic internal state and key recovery attack is developed for keystream generators with keyed update function having guess capacity one-half. Involving key bits directly and cyclically in the update function of a keystream generator leads to a weakness for recovering key values. Since it is an internal state recovery attack, initialization phase is not considered. The complexity of the attack is reduced by using variables and solving nonlinear equations during key recovery. As a proof of concept, the number of variables is chosen as six and the attack is successfully mounted on Plantlet algorithm and internal state bits and key bits are recovered. Increasing the number of variables will reduce attack complexity, but it would not be easy to generate and multiplicate the nonlinear combinations of the variables and to find the solution of the generated nonlinear equations. Precomputation and memory would be needed for both the generation and the multiplication of nonlinear combinations of these variables and for finding the solution of the generated nonlinear equations.
